The Pentagon's 90-day plan isn't a warning about Iran

Iranian hackers have been tampering with internet-exposed control equipment at American utilities since March 2026. Most of that exposure can be fixed by the utilities themselves.
There is real danger in misreporting the facts of events to create panic when there is no panic to be had. Lt. Gen. Russel Honoré's Nov. 13 column in The Hill takes two unrelated news stories and uses them to warn that Iran could knock out American power for months. Honoré earned a lot of respect when he led the military response to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in 2005, and that is part of why the column needs a response. People listen when he talks about disasters. Neither of the stories he relies on says anything about Iran.
The first story Honoré relies on is the United Kingdom (U.K.) Be Ready campaign, which the Cabinet Office launched on Oct. 22 as the first phase of a three-year national preparedness effort. The campaign asks every household to keep three days of water, food that doesn't need cooking, cash and a battery radio. The reasons the government gave were extreme weather, cyberattacks and war in general. When critics accused the government of scaremongering, Britain's defence secretary said he wanted people to be "alert but not alarmed." The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has been giving Americans the same kind of advice for years, to keep a few days of supplies at home, and it has never been tied to a specific country.
The 90-day figure Honoré leans on comes from a Fortune report that relayed Fox News Digital's reporting on internal Pentagon documents. Those documents describe a program called FORTRESS America, which would require every major military base in the continental United States to keep essential operations running for at least 90 days without the civilian power grid or outside supply. It's a planning standard for a new program office that a Sept. 30 memo ordered set up within 30 days, and nothing in the reporting describes it as a notice telling bases to prepare for an incoming attack. When Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth talked about keeping bases powered in a September speech at Marine Corps Base Quantico in Virginia, he described losing the grid "by cyber attack, by sabotage, or by any means." He never mentioned Iran, and Iran doesn't come up anywhere in the reporting on the program.
Ninety days without outside support is the kind of requirement you plan for when you expect a long war against a major military power, and China is the country U.S. agencies have been warning about. In February 2024, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) warned that a Chinese state-sponsored hacking group called Volt Typhoon had been placing itself inside the networks of U.S. communications, energy, transportation and water organizations. The agencies assessed that the group was positioning itself to disrupt or destroy those services during a major crisis or conflict with the United States.
Water plants, power systems and municipal facilities run on small industrial computers that open valves, start pumps and switch equipment based on how they are programmed. These devices are called programmable logic controllers (PLCs). Operators often connect them to the internet so they can manage them remotely, which also means anyone who finds them online can try to connect to them. On April 7, 2026, the FBI, CISA, NSA, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Energy and U.S. Cyber Command's Cyber National Mission Force published joint advisory AA26-097A. The advisory warned that an Iranian-affiliated hacking group had been disrupting PLCs in U.S. water, energy and local government systems since at least March.
The group reached Rockwell Automation's Allen-Bradley controllers that were exposed to the open internet, using the same legitimate configuration software the operators use. Once they were connected, they copied the project files that hold each controller's programming. They changed the readings operators were seeing on their control screens, so the people running the plant could no longer trust what the system was showing them. They also installed remote access software so they could come back later. Some victims had operations disrupted and lost money as a result. The agencies updated the advisory on July 22 as the activity continued.
This is a real problem for the utilities that were hit. Getting into an exposed controller at one water plant is still a long way from turning off power across a region for three months. Iran has used the same method for years, going back at least to November 2023, when a group called CyberAv3ngers, tied to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), got into an exposed controller at a water authority in Aliquippa, Pennsylvania. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) describes Iran's record against U.S. water and energy facilities as mostly low-sophistication attacks that exploit basic weaknesses in internet-connected systems. Those attacks work because utilities leave equipment reachable from the internet with weak protection on it.
Honoré also says governors and mayors have been left out of planning, but the guidance they need was published openly in that advisory. It listed eight internet addresses the attackers used along with other technical traces, which defenders call indicators of compromise, so any utility can search its own logs for signs of the same activity. It also told operators to make sure every connection into those controllers goes through access the utility monitors and controls. Rockwell controllers that have a physical key switch can be turned to the run position, which blocks anyone from reprogramming them remotely. If a mayor wants to do something about the Iranian threat, the most useful step is to ask the city's water and power operators whether any of their controllers can be reached from the internet, and to get them taken off the internet if the answer is yes.
When the U.K. government released the Be Ready campaign, stores in Britain started running out of tinned food, bottled water and radios. The government had only asked households to keep three days of supplies on hand. The problem with Honoré's column is that it puts a 90-day number in front of American readers and then says an Iranian cyberattack on civilian life is "not outside the realm of possibility." A reader who doesn't know where that number came from is going to assume it applies to their own household and not to military bases. That is how the same kind of panic buying starts here. People also remember when a warning turns out to be overblown, and they are less likely to act the next time the warning is real.
Honoré is right that households should keep a few days of water, food, medicine and a battery radio on hand. That has been standard hurricane season advice for decades, and it covers a cyberattack that knocks out power for a few days just as well. What Americans need from someone with his credibility is an accurate account of what Iran is actually doing to our utilities. The utilities being targeted can start closing off the access the attackers are using today.
Keith Pachulski is managing partner of Red Cell Security, LLC, a Dallas-based firm specializing in penetration testing and security assessments, and the author of "Guide to Modern Security Operations."




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